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STRIPPING DOWN A VICTORY FOR ADULT 
ENTERTAINMENT: SHOWTIME 
ENTERTAINMENT, LLC V. TOWN OF MENDON  
ETHAN BOND* 
In a win for adult entertainment, the First Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Showtime Entertainment, LLC v. Town of Mendon struck down a town’s 
zoning ordinance restricting the size and operating hours of a nude dancing 
establishment.  The First Circuit explained that the town did not adequately 
support its concerns that the business would cause harmful secondary 
effects and therefore could not limit the business’s operation. 
This Comment traces the history of adult entertainment zoning 
jurisprudence, placing special emphasis on the Supreme Court’s Renton 
test and Alameda burden-shifting approach.  It then argues that the First 
Circuit’s ruling is inconsistent with the Renton and Alameda framework 
and should be overturned because the court improperly required the town to 
meet a heightened burden of proof.  The town provided adequate support 
that the adult business would alter the town’s rural charm and cause traffic 
congestion along Route 16 and therefore should have been allowed to 
“experiment with solutions” to these problems. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Your children take the bus home from school one afternoon.  Their 
regular commute takes about fifteen minutes.  Although you live in a 
mostly rural town, it includes a small commercial district that lies on the 
border of Route 16. The district contains a few warehouses, a drive-in 
movie theater, and some restaurants.  Your children look out the window 
and take in their surroundings as they do every day on the bus ride home.  
One child spots something new: a 9,000 square foot establishment on the 
                                                          
 *Thank you Duke Ho, Britta Norwick, and Professor Kimberly West-Faulcon for helpful 
comments and suggestions.  I want to give a very special thanks to Professor Mary Dant for her 
efforts.  All mistakes are my own. 
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edge of the commercial district.  At the top of the building, a sign reads, 
“Live! Nude Dancers.”1 
In May 2008, the town of Mendon, Massachusetts enacted zoning 
regulations intended to mitigate the effects of adult entertainment 
businesses by limiting their location to select parcels bordering Route 16.2  
The preamble to section 5.01 read: 
 
The purpose of this Adult Entertainment Overlay District section 
of the Town of Mendon Zoning Bylaws is to address and 
mitigate the secondary effects of adult entertainment 
establishments . . . .  These effects include increased crime, and 
adverse effects on public health, the business climate, the 
property values of residential and commercial property and the 
quality of life. 
 
The provisions of this section have neither the purpose nor intent 
of imposing a limitation on the content of any communicative 
matter or materials, including sexually oriented matter or 
materials.  Similarly, it is not the purpose or intent of this 
Section (Overlay District) to restrict or deny access to adult 
entertainment establishments or to sexually oriented matter or 
materials that is protected by the Constitutions of the United 
States and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts . . . .3 
 
The following month, Showtime Entertainment LLC (“Showtime”) 
applied for a license to build a nude dancing club on one of these parcels.4  
The proposed establishment would comprise approximately 8,935 square 
                                                          
1.  This paragraph is hypothetical and “Live! Nude Dancers” is not the actual name of 
Showtime’s establishment.  Per Mendon’s bylaws, it is unclear whether an adult establishment 
can erect a sign reading “Live! Nude Dancers.”  While section 5.01(f)(iii) mandates that a 
business cannot erect a sign conveying sexual content, section 5.01(f)(iv) allows an adult 
establishment to construct a sign identifying the name and purpose of the business.  MENDON, 
MASS., ZONING BY-LAWS art. 5, § 5.01(f)(iii)-(iv) (2016). 
 
2.  Showtime Entm’t, LLC v. Mendon, Mass. (Showtime II), 769 F.3d 61, 66 (1st Cir. 
2014). 
 
3.  Id.; see also MENDON, MASS., ZONING BY-LAWS art. 5, § 5.01(b) (2016). 
 
4.  Showtime II, 769 F.3d at 67. 
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feet, with space to accommodate 244 patrons and 82 parking spaces.5  At a 
public hearing on September 15, 2008, town residents voiced their 
disapproval of the proposed project.6  They encouraged the Board of 
Selectmen (“Board”) to enact additional bylaws: (1) imposing height and 
size restrictions on adult entertainment establishments, (2) limiting the 
operating hours of these businesses, and (3) banning the sale and 
consumption of alcohol on the property.7 
The town rejected Showtime’s proposal, citing public health, safety, 
noise pollution, and traffic concerns.8  A week later, the town held a special 
public meeting to discuss the negative effects adult entertainment 
businesses cause on surrounding areas.9  In particular, residents identified 
three primary justifications for enacting additional restrictions: (1) to 
protect Mendon’s “historically rural atmosphere,” (2) to ensure traffic 
safety and prevent traffic congestion, and (3) to reduce crime that results 
from a combination of adult entertainment and alcohol.10  During the 
meeting, the residents voted to amend Mendon’s bylaws.11  Under the 
amended ordinance, no adult entertainment establishment could exceed 
2,000 square feet in area and fourteen feet in height, open earlier than 4:30 
p.m. on school days, or sell alcohol on its premises.12 
Showtime amended its application to comply with the new bylaws 
and included plans to build a single-story, 2,000-square-foot building that 
would accommodate 74 customers and a parking lot with 103 spaces.13  
Showtime also agreed not to open before 4:30 p.m. or sell alcohol on its 
property.14  It also presented a traffic study, which concluded that “[p]eak-
                                                          
5.  Id.  
 
6.  Id. 
 
7.  Id. 
 
8.  Id.  
 
9.  Id.  
 
10.  Showtime II, 769 F.3d at 67–68 
 
11.  Id. At 67. 
 
12.  Id. at 67–68. 
 
13.  Id. at 68. 
 
14.  See id.  
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hour traffic volume increases as a result of the development [would] have 
negligible impacts on [traffic near the Overlay District].”15  On May 3, 
2010, the Board approved Showtime’s amended proposal.16 
Nevertheless, Showtime sued the town of Mendon in federal court, 
claiming that the zoning bylaws restricting its size and hours of operation 
were unconstitutional restrictions of expressive activity under the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.17  It also claimed that Article 
16 of the Massachusetts state constitution precluded the alcohol ban.18  
However, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Mendon, 
concluding that the zoning and alcohol restrictions were constitutional.19  
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed and remanded the 
zoning claims back to the district court for entry of summary judgment in 
favor of Showtime.20  Finding that the alcohol claim involved complex 
issues of state constitutional law, the First Circuit certified questions 
concerning the alcohol ban to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
(“SJC”) to resolve.21 
This Comment will first provide an overview of adult entertainment 
zoning jurisprudence and the Supreme Court’s treatment of ordinances that 
restrict an adult business’s ability to operate.  It will then argue that, in the 
case of Showtime Entertainment, LLC v. Town of Mendon, the First Circuit 
misapplied Supreme Court precedent in striking down Mendon’s ordinance 
by imposing a heightened standard.  This Comment does not address the 
SJC’s ruling on the alcohol ban.22 
                                                          
15.  Id.  
 
16.  Showtime II, 769 F.3d at 68. 
 
17.  Id. at 69. 
 
18.  Id.  
 
19.  Id. 
 
20.  Id. at 82. 
 
21.  Id. at 82–83.  
 
22.  See generally Showtime Entm’t, LLC v. Town of Mendon, 32 N.E.3d 1259 (Mass. 
2015).  For curious readers, the SJC concluded that Mendon had a substantial government interest 
in regulating crime and an alcohol ban could reasonably serve that purpose, but the ban was not 
adequately tailored to further this purpose.  Id. at 1263–67 
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II. MUNICIPAL ZONING OF ADULT ENTERTAINMENT BUSINESSES: 
OVERVIEW AND APPLICATION 
This section will briefly explore traditional First Amendment 
jurisprudence and chronologically trace the Supreme Court’s treatment of 
adult entertainment zoning ordinances. 
A. The First Amendment and a Multi-Step Approach 
The First Amendment provides that Congress shall make no law 
abridging the freedom of speech.23  Not all speech is created equal, 
however, and the Supreme Court has found that certain categories of 
speech are entitled to lesser constitutional protection than others.24  In 
Miller v. California, the Court declared that while the First Amendment 
protects works that have “serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific 
value, . . . the public portrayal of hard-core sexual conduct for its own sake, 
and for the ensuing commercial gain, is a different matter.”25  As Justice 
Stevens famously quipped in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., “few 
of us would march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the 
citizen’s right to see ‘Specified Sexual Activities’ exhibited in the theaters 
of our choice.”26  Despite society’s “lesser interest in protecting 
                                                          
23.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 
24.  See, e.g., Young v. Am. Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (“[E]ven though 
we recognize that the First Amendment will not tolerate the total suppression of erotic materials 
that have some arguably artistic value, it is manifest that society's interest in protecting this type 
of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled 
political debate that inspired Voltaire's immortal comment.”); Wilson R. Huhn, Assessing the 
Constitutionality of Laws That Are Both Content-Based and Content-Neutral: The Emerging 
Constitutional Calculus, 79 IND. L.J. 801, 804–05 (2004) (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
valuation of political speech, commercial speech, and fighting words and the standard of scrutiny 
such speech is afforded). 
 
25.  Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34–35 (1973) (“[T]o equate the free and robust 
exchange of ideas and political debate with commercial exploitation of obscene material demeans 
the grand conception of the First Amendment and its high purposes in the historic struggle for 
freedom.”).  Miller established the three-part test for obscenity and reaffirmed the principle that 
obscene material is not constitutionally protected.  Id. at 24.  Yet commercial entities that market 
non-obscene, erotic materials (such as adult movie theaters and adult bookstores) enjoy some 
First Amendment protection.  
 
26.  Young, 427 U.S. at 70. 
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commercial material, such as borderline pornography,” this speech is still 
protected by the First Amendment, albeit to a limited extent.27 
The Supreme Court takes a multistep approach in evaluating the 
constitutionality of zoning ordinances that regulate adult entertainment 
businesses.28  First, it determines whether the ordinance completely bans 
the business from residing within municipal limits or if it merely restricts 
the time, place, and manner the business can operate.29 
Second, it determines whether the time, place, and manner restriction 
is content-based or content-neutral.30  For reasons that will become 
apparent, some scholars suggest that this distinction is often confusing, 
arbitrary, and impossible to discern.31  Others suggest that the Supreme 
Court has incorrectly framed the analysis.32  However meritorious these 
critiques, this Comment will not explore the depths of that discussion.  
Rather, this Comment will focus on the distinction as the Supreme Court 
has developed and interpreted it. 
1. The Content Distinction 
The Supreme Court places great emphasis on the content distinction, 
that is, whether a government restriction on lawful speech is “content-
based” or “content-neutral.”33  As the Court has framed the analysis, a 
                                                          
27.  See id. (acknowledging that the First Amendment would not tolerate the total 
suppression of non-obscene, erotic materials); Matthew L. McGinnis, Sex, But Not the City: 
Adult-Entertainment Zoning, the First Amendment, and Residential and Rural Municipalities, 46 
B.C. L. REV. 625, 634 (2005). 
 
28.  See Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46–47 (1986). 
 
29.  Id.  
 
30.  Id. at 47. 
 
31.  See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 
STAN. L. REV. 113, 128–50 (1981) (arguing that content-neutral regulations should logically be as 
suspect as content-based regulations because both impair the free flow of expression, and 
accordingly, the content distinction should be abandoned as theoretically invalid and 
pragmatically unworkable). 
 
32.  See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom 
of Speech: Problems in the Supreme Court’s Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 49, 56–64 (2000) 
(identifying three problems with how the Court has applied the principle of content neutrality). 
 
33.  See id. at 53 ("Today, virtually every free speech case turns on the application of the 
distinction between content-based and content-neutral laws.”).  
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content-based regulation restricts a particular form of speech on the basis of 
its “message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”34  For example, in 
Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, a Chicago ordinance banned 
picketing near school grounds except for picketing involving peaceful labor 
disputes.35  The Court struck down the ordinance, concluding it 
impermissibly discriminated against all non-labor picketing because of its 
subject matter without offering a legitimate reason why peaceful labor 
picketing was allowed.36  Similarly in United States v. Playboy 
Entertainment Group, the Court found that a federal telecommunications 
regulation requiring cable providers to “scramble” or block sexually 
explicit channels during late-night hours was content-based, because it 
singled out promiscuous material.37  The law aimed to prevent “signal 
bleed” where children might mistakenly have access to the adult content.38  
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, explained that the regulation 
“focuse[d] only on the content of the speech and the direct impact that 
speech ha[d] on its listeners.”39 
Content-based speech restrictions are “presumptively invalid” and are 
therefore subject to strict scrutiny.40  Under strict scrutiny, a content-based 
speech regulation survives only if it is “narrowly tailored to promote a 
compelling Government interest” and the means used to achieve that 
interest are “the least restrictive” available.41  Such content-based speech 
regulations will rarely be upheld.42 
                                                          
34.  Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). 
 
35.  Id. at 92–93. 
 
36.  See id. at 100–01 (“If peaceful labor picketing is permitted, there is no justification for 
prohibiting all non-labor picketing, both peaceful and non-peaceful.  ‘Peaceful’ non-labor 
picketing, however the term ‘peaceful’ is defined, is obviously no more disruptive than ‘peaceful’ 
labor picketing.  But Chicago's ordinance permits the latter and prohibits the former.”). 
 
37.  United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 806–07, 811–12 (2000). 
 
38.  Id. at 806. 
 
39.  Id. at 811 (citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)). 
 
40.  Id. at 813–817. 
 
41.  Id. at 813 (emphasis added) (citing Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 
115, 126 (1989)). 
 
42.  Id. at 818 ("The Constitution exists precisely so that opinions and judgments, 
including esthetic and moral judgments about art and literature, can be formed, tested, and 
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By contrast, a content-neutral speech regulation serves purposes 
“unrelated to the content” of expression and therefore receives a lesser 
degree of scrutiny.43  A content-neutral restriction on the time, place, and or 
manner of speech is permissible if it is narrowly tailored to serve a 
significant government interest and leaves open ample alternative channels 
of communication.44  The Supreme Court officially recognized the time, 
place, and manner test in the context of adult entertainment in Renton v. 
Playtime Theaters.45  In analyzing the content distinction of the zoning 
ordinance, the Renton Court reasoned that the “predominate” goal of the 
legislation was to prevent the “secondary effects” of the speech—i.e., the 
harmful effects the speech has on the quality of the neighborhood—and not 
the content of the speech itself.46 Although the regulation facially singled 
out adult establishments for discriminatory treatment, the Court deemed the 
ordinance content-neutral because the city’s primary purpose was to 
minimize deleterious effects to the community.47  Thus, under Renton, an 
adult entertainment zoning ordinance is said to regulate only the 
“secondary effects” of such speech and will generally be deemed content-
neutral.48 
                                                          
expressed. What the Constitution says is that these judgments are for the individual to make, not 
for the Government to decree, even with the mandate or approval of a majority.”). 
 
43.  Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642, 662 (1994) (applying 
intermediate scrutiny to content-neutral speech restrictions because they generally “pose a less 
substantial risk of excising certain ideas or viewpoints from the public dialogue”); Ward v. Rock 
Against Racism, 429 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (explaining that a content-neutral speech restriction 
affects speech only incidentally and clarifying the legal standard applicable to time, place, and 
manner regulations). 
 
44.  Ward, 429 U.S. at 791. 
 
45.  David J. Christiansen, Zoning and the First Amendment Rights of Adult 
Entertainment, 22 VAL. UNIV. L. REV. 695, 712 & n.127 (1988) (noting that, before Renton, 
Justice Powell had suggested adoption of the time, place, and manner standard in his concurring 
opinion in Young). 
 
46.  Renton, 475 U.S. at 47. 
 
47.  See id. at 47–48. 
 
48.  Id. But see McGinnis, supra note 27, at 629 n.35 (collecting legal scholarship that 
maintains that adult entertainment zoning ordinances are not content-neutral, despite the Court’s 
interpretation in Renton); City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 448 (2002) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (naming the content-neutral designation in Renton as “a fiction”).  For a 
good analysis on how the Court’s intent-based approach further blurs the content distinction, see 
Chemerinsky, supra note 32, at 59–61. 
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2. The Renton Test 
Where an adult establishment is regulated by a content-neutral time, 
manner, or place restriction, courts apply the Renton test, a form of 
intermediate scrutiny.49  Under the Renton test, a zoning regulation of adult 
businesses is constitutional where it: (1) is narrowly tailored to serve a 
substantial government purpose and (2) leaves open alternative channels of 
communication.50 
A municipality may satisfy the first prong under Renton by showing 
that the secondary effects it hopes to prevent are important and the 
regulation “affect[s] only that category of [businesses] shown to produce 
the unwanted secondary effects.”51  The regulation may not be “under-
inclusive,” meaning it cannot regulate only some businesses that produce 
the unwanted secondary effects while leaving others unscathed.52  
Furthermore, the municipality need not provide studies proving that its 
regulation will be effective.53  It may rely upon studies by foreign cities and 
upon any evidence “reasonably believed to be relevant” to addressing its 
problems.54 
A municipality may satisfy the second prong under Renton by 
showing that its regulation does not prevent a business owner from 
otherwise espousing his message.55  For example, a city may show that the 
business owner can operate his establishment elsewhere within city limits.56 
                                                          
49.  See Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 440 (identifying the Renton standard as “intermediate 
scrutiny”). 
 
50.  See Renton, 475 U.S. at 47; Christiansen, supra note 45, at 712 (describing the Renton 
test applied in adult entertainment cases as a similar but relaxed standard of the traditional time, 
place, and manner test). 
 
51.  Renton, 475 U.S. at 52.  Though the Court did not explain what makes a government 
interest “substantial,” it appears to have assumed that cities have important interests in regulating 
crime and maintaining the quality of their neighborhoods. 
 
52.  Id.  
 
53.  See id. at 51–52. 
 
54.  Id. at 51–52. 
 
55.  See id. at 54. 
 
56.  See id. 
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B. Zoning Adult Entertainment Businesses—The Supreme Court Develops a 
Standard 
This section focuses on the Supreme Court’s holdings in several cases 
where municipalities enacted legislation limiting the operation of adult 
businesses. 
1. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. (1976)—In a Case of First 
Impression, the Supreme Court Upholds a Zoning Ordinance That 
Dispersed, but Did Not Band, Adult Businesses 
The Supreme Court first tackled adult entertainment zoning in the 
1976 case Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. (“Young”).57  In Young, 
the Court upheld a Detroit ordinance aimed at dispersing adult movie 
theaters from a single, concentrated area.58  Under the ordinance, adult 
theaters could not operate within 1,000 feet of each other or within 500 feet 
of a residential area.59  The alleged purpose of the ordinance was to 
preserve the “quality of urban life” by removing concentrated areas of adult 
business that exacerbated crime and diminished surrounding property 
values.60 
The Court determined that the ordinance, which merely aimed to 
scatter these businesses, was a “place” restriction—not a total ban on adult 
entertainment.61  The Court then found that the ordinance was content-
neutral because, although it singled out adult businesses on the basis of 
their content, the primary purpose of the regulation was to mitigate these 
harmful secondary effects—namely, surges in crime and drops in property 
values.62 
Although this case was decided before Renton, the Young Court 
appeared to formulate early sketches of the Renton test.  Notably, the 
Detroit ordinance singled out only businesses that displayed nudity.63  
                                                          
57.  Young, 427 U.S. at 50; see McGinnis, supra note 27, at 632. 
 
58.  Young, 427 U.S. at 52, 72. 
 
59.  Id. at 52. 
 
60.  See id. at 55; see also McGinnis, supra note 27, at 634. 
 
61.  See Young, 427 U.S. at 63. 
 
62.  See id. at 71–72; McGinnis, supra note 27, at 634. 
 
63.  Young, 427 U.S. at 70. 
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Thus, the ordinance appeared to target businesses on the basis of their 
content.  However, the Young Court found that the primary intent behind 
the ordinance was not to prohibit businesses from displaying nudity, but to 
reduce the harm those businesses have on the quality of urban life.64  The 
Young Court accordingly found the ordinance content-neutral.65 
The Court inferred that Detroit’s aims were “significant governmental 
interests,”66 and it alluded to “alternative avenues of communication” when 
it found that the ordinance, which did not ban but merely dispersed these 
businesses, left the adult entertainment market “essentially unrestrained.”67  
Ultimately, the Young Supreme Court upheld the ordinance.68 
2. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim (1981)—The Supreme Court 
Invalidates a Zoning Ordinance Imposing an Outright Ban on Live 
Entertainment 
In Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim (“Schad”), the Supreme Court 
declared unconstitutional an ordinance that mandated a total ban on all 
forms of live entertainment in a residential community, including nude 
dancing.69  In striking down the ordinance, the Court found that Young was 
not controlling because the ordinance there imposed a “place” restriction, 
not an outright ban.70 
The Court reasoned that the regulation in Schad failed on two fronts.71  
First, the regulation was not narrowly tailored to serve any important 
                                                          
64.  Id. at 71–72. .  
 
65.  See id. at 70–73 (“Such a line may be drawn on the basis of content without violating 
the government's paramount obligation of neutrality in its regulation of protected communication. 
For the regulation of the places where sexually explicit films may be exhibited is unaffected by 
whatever social, political, or philosophical message a film may be intended to communicate; 
whether a motion picture ridicules or characterizes one point of view or another, the effect of the 
ordinances is exactly the same.”). 
 
66.  See id. at 63 n.18, 71 (“[T]he city’s interest in attempting to preserve the quality of 
urban life is one that must be accorded high respect.”). 
 
67.  Id. at 62. 
 
68.  See id. at 70–73. 
 
69.  See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981). 
 
70.   Id. at 71–72. 
 
71.  See id. at 74–76  (finding the regulation was not “narrowly drawn” and did not leave 
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government interest.72  The town, which did not offer any justification on 
the face of its ordinance, later explained that its ban was necessary to serve 
its goal of catering to the “immediate needs” of town residents and 
ensuring that parking, trash, and police protection would not be impacted.73  
According to the Court, however, the town fatally failed to explain how a 
sweeping ban was necessary to address these goals.74  Second, the 
ordinance did not leave open alternative channels of communication for 
businesses because they could not operate anywhere within town limits.75  
Therefore, the ordinance did not withstand scrutiny.76 
3. Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc. (1986)—The Supreme Court Upholds 
an Ordinance Requiring Relocation of Adult Businesses 
Perhaps no Supreme Court opinion more directly mirrors the facts of 
Showtime than Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc. (“Renton”).  In Renton, 
the Supreme Court upheld a city’s zoning ordinance restricting the location 
of adult entertainment establishments.77  Under the regulation, no adult 
establishment could reside within 1,000 feet of residential property or 
within one mile of any school.78  The purpose of the regulation was to 
prevent the secondary effects caused by these businesses, such as increased 
crime.79  The ordinance left open approximately 520 acres, or five percent 
of Renton’s total area, on which these businesses could operate.80 
                                                          
open “alternative channels of communication”). 
 
72.  Id. at 73–74. 
 
73.  Id. at 67, 72–73. 
 
74.  See id. at 74 (“The Borough has not established that its interests could not be met by 
restrictions that are less intrusive on protected forms of expression.”). 
 
75.  See Schad, 452 U.S. at 75–76. 
 
76.   See id. at 77. 
 
77.  See Renton, 475 U.S. at 54–55. 
 
78.  Id. at 44. 
 
79.  See id. at 48. 
 
80.  See id. at 53. 
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The Supreme Court began by applying its multi-step inquiry.81  First, 
it found that the ordinance imposed a place restriction, not a total ban, 
because it allowed adult businesses to relocate within city limits.82  Second, 
it found the restriction content-neutral.83  The Court explained that although 
the ordinance had content-based elements because it specifically targeted 
adult businesses on the basis of their suggestive content, the legislative 
intent of the ordinance was to eliminate the secondary effects they caused.84 
Next, the Supreme Court enumerated and then applied its two-
pronged test—which would later become a staple in adult entertainment 
zoning jurisprudence.85  First, it determined that the city demonstrated a 
substantial government interest, noting that “a city’s interest in attempting 
to preserve the quality of urban life is one that must be accorded high 
respect.”86  Although the city had not provided its own studies supporting 
its concerns about the secondary effects of adult businesses, it was allowed 
to “rely on the experiences of . . . other cities,” and was “allowed a 
reasonable opportunity to experiment with solutions to admittedly serious 
problems.”87  The city could rely on any information “reasonably believed 
to be relevant to the problem the city addresses.”88 
The Court also noted that the ordinance was sufficiently “narrowly 
tailored” because it affected “only that category of theaters shown to 
produce the unwanted secondary effects.”89  Therefore, the ordinance was 
                                                          
81.  See id. at 46–54 (proceeding by first describing the ordinance as a time, manner, or 
place regulation, then determining the content-distinction, then analyzing the “substantial 
government interest” and “reasonable alternative avenues of communication”). 
 
82.  See id. at 46. 
 
83.  See Renton, 475 U.S. at 48–49. 
 
84.  See id. at 47–49. 
 
85.  See id. at 50–54; see also McGinnis, supra note 27, at 626–27 (describing the Renton 
test); Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425; City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000). 
 
86.  Renton, 475 U.S. at 50. 
 
87.  Id. at 51–52. 
 
88.  Id. at 51. 
 
89.  Id. at 52. 
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not “under-inclusive.”90  The Court elaborated that the city could withstand 
future under-inclusiveness challenges by later amending its bylaws if and 
when other businesses produced similar secondary effects.91 
Second, the Court found that the ordinance left open alternative 
channels of communication for adult businesses.92  It noted that, although 
adult businesses could only relocate to five percent of the city’s total land, 
the mere fact that the ordinance left “some areas” open to these businesses 
was legally sufficient to pass muster.93 
4.  City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M. (2000)—A Municipality May Rely on 
Evidence of Secondary Effects from the Cities in Renton and Young 
In City of Erie, v. Pap’s A.M. (“Pap’s A.M.”), a Supreme Court 
plurality upheld a city’s statute that criminalized all forms of public 
nudity.94  The ordinance’s preamble read that its purpose was to limit the 
adverse impacts of live nudity on “public health, safety and welfare.”95  It 
required that erotic dancers wear at least “pasties” and a “G-string.”96  
Although the city offered its own evidence supporting its assessment of 
these secondary effects, the Court found that it could properly rely on the 
evidence set forth in Renton and Young that even a single adult 
establishment in a neighborhood causes harmful secondary effects.97 
Justice O’Connor, writing for the plurality, flatly rejected Justice 
Souter’s argument that a city must develop an “evidentiary record” 
supporting its ordinance.98  O’Connor also rejected the dissenting view’s 
“questioning the wisdom” of the city’s approach.99  Echoing Renton, 
                                                          
90.  Id.  
  
91.  See id. at 52–53. 
 
92.  See Renton, 475 U.S. at 53–54. 
 
93.  See id. at 54. 
 
94.  See Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 283. 
 
95.  Id. at 290. 
 
96.  Id. at 284. 
 
97.  Id. at 297. 
 
98.  See id. at 299–300. 
 
99.  See id. at 299–301. 
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O’Connor reasoned that the city was allowed to “experiment with solutions 
to admittedly serious problems,” even where other remedies would clearly 
prove more effective.100  The city’s chosen approach need only “further the 
[government’s] interest” in reducing secondary effects.101 
5.  City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc. (2002)—The Supreme Court 
Solidifies Its Burden-Shifting Approach Within the Renton Framework 
In City of L.A. Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc. (“Alameda 
Books”), the Supreme Court— again by plurality— upheld a Los Angeles 
zoning ordinance that prohibited more than one adult establishment from 
operating in a single building or structure.102  By enacting the ordinance, 
the city hoped to reduce the effects of crime inherent in areas of 
concentrated adult businesses.103  Like the regulations in Young and 
Renton, the regulation in Alameda Books aimed to disperse adult businesses 
but not ban them outright.104  In support of its ordinance, the city cited a 
1977 police study concluding that concentrated areas of adult businesses 
are associated with more crime.105 
The Alameda Books plurality focused its discussion on the first prong 
of the two-part Renton test and, in particular, the degree of proof necessary 
to show that the city’s ordinance served its “substantial government 
interest” in reducing crime.106  The Court reasoned that the city was not 
required to prove that its ordinance would meet its substantial government 
interest so long as the evidence it relied on “‘fairly support[s]’ . . . the city’s 
rationale for its ordinance.”107  It similarly explained that a judiciary may 
not substitute its own theory or draw its own conclusions from a city’s 
study where there is more than one plausible way to interpret the data.108  
                                                          
100.  Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 299–301. 
 
101.  See id.  
 
102.  Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 430. 
 
103.  Id. at 429–30. 
 
104.  See id. at 430–31; see also Renton, 475 U.S. at 46; Young, 427 U.S. at 63. 
 
105.  Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 430. 
 
106.  Id. at 435, 438–39. 
 
107.  Id. at 438.–39. 
 
108.  See id. at 437–38, 440–42. 
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The plurality noted that a city is in a better position than a court to gather 
and interpret data on local problems.109 
However, the plurality here appeared to go further than Renton by 
discussing the possibility of burden-shifting.110  The Court reasoned that 
although a city cannot rely on “shoddy data or reasoning,” it may meet its 
initial burden by an appeal to common sense and common judgment that its 
regulation will mitigate the undesirable secondary effects.111  However, a 
business can dispute this common sense evidence by either showing that 
the city’s evidence does not support its rationale or introducing its own 
evidence contradicting the city’s findings.112  The business must provide 
“actual and convincing” evidence to do so.113  If the business successfully 
does so, the “burden shifts back to the [city] to supplement the record with 
evidence renewing support for a theory that justifies its ordinance.”114 
The plurality found, however, that the city could rely on the 1977 
police study and reasonably infer from the evidence that prohibiting an 
adult business from operating in the same structure as another would 
reduce crime.115  Thus, the city met its burden even where alternative 
theories suggested that its ordinance would not affect crime rates 
mentioned in the study.116  Because the adult business failed to cast doubt 
on the city’s interpretation of the study or provide its own contrary 
evidence, the ordinance was constitutional.117 
III. SHOWTIME ENTERTAINMENT, LLC V. TOWN OF MENDON: THE 
DISTRICT COURT’S FINDINGS AND THE FIRST CIRCUIT’S REVERSAL 
In the instant case, the District Court of Massachusetts and the Court 
of Appeals for the First Circuit applied the Supreme Court’s principles but 
                                                          
109.  Id. at 440. 
 
110.  See id. at 439.  
 
111.  See Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 438–39. 
 
112.  Id.  
 
113.  Id. at 439. 
 
114.  Id. 
 
115.  See id. at 436–37. 
 
116.  See id. at 437, 439. 
 
117.  Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 438–43. 
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reached opposing conclusions.118  Both courts applied intermediate 
scrutiny119 but they disagreed about whether Mendon’s bylaws targeted 
Showtime’s secondary effects and whether the regulations were under-
inclusive, meaning they did not target other businesses that produced the 
same secondary effects.120  The courts separately considered Mendon’s two 
primary concerns: (1) protecting Mendon’s rural aesthetics and (2) 
preventing traffic congestion.121  Under Renton and Alameda Books, the 
district court found that Mendon met its burden.122  The First Circuit held 
the opposite.123  Interestingly, the appellate court made only brief mention 
of Renton and did not account for the Alameda Books burden-shifting 
approach in its analysis.124  Rather, the “narrow application” of Mendon’s 
zoning bylaws were “tellingly underinclusive,” such that Mendon failed to 
prove its bylaws actually furthered a substantial interest in regulating the 
secondary effects of adult-entertainment businesses.125 
A. Protecting Mendon’s Rural Aesthetics 
One of Mendon’s primary concerns when it enacted its adult 
entertainment zoning bylaws was maintaining its historically rural 
atmosphere.126  This primary concern embodies two related but distinct 
concerns: maintaining its small-town charm and its surrounding property 
values.127  According to Showtime, however, Mendon’s ordinance did not 
                                                          
118.  See generally Showtime Entm’t, LLC v. Town of Mendon (Showtime II), 769 F.3d 
61 (1st Cir. 2014); Showtime Entm’t LLC v. Ammendolia (Showtime I), 885 F. Supp. 2d 507 (D. 
Mass. 2012). 
 
119.  Showtime II, 769 F.3d at 72 (“Therefore, recognizing that the zoning bylaws’ 
express terms set forth content-neutral purposes, we proceed in the application of intermediate 
scrutiny while withholding judgment as to the bylaws’ true content neutrality.”); Showtime I, 885 
F. Supp. 2d at 522, 529 (“[T]he regulations will be reviewed under the intermediate level of 
scrutiny outlined in Renton.”). 
 
120.  See Showtime II, 769 F.3d at 72–78; Showtime I, 885 F. Supp. 2d 522–27. 
 
121.  See Showtime II, 769 F.3d at 72–78; Showtime I, 885 F. Supp. 2d 522–27. 
 
122.  Showtime I, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 522–27. 
 
123.  Showtime II, 769 F.3d at 72–78. 
 
124.  See id. at 72. 
 
125.  See id. at 78. 
 
126.  See Showtime I, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 519. 
 
127.  See id. at 521. 
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address these concerns because less promiscuous neighboring parcels were 
not subject to the same restrictions as Showtime’s adult entertainment 
business.128  Neighboring developments, for instance, were larger than the 
2,000 square foot restriction imposed on Showtime, yet did “not appear 
particularly rural in character.”129  Thus, Showtime argued, the restrictions 
were not genuinely designed to promote the visual character of the town, 
but instead to suppress expression.130 
The district court disagreed with Showtime’s arguments.131  Mendon 
adequately justified its concern about aesthetic character because it 
believed the addition of an adult business could further detract from the 
town’s aesthetics.132  The town cited studies that supported a positive 
correlation between adult entertainment businesses and blight, and a 
negative correlation between adult entertainment businesses and 
surrounding property values.133  Applying the burden-shifting approach 
developed in Alameda Books, the district court found that Mendon had met 
its initial burden because it could have reasonably concluded that imposing 
a size requirement would mitigate these undesirable effects.134  Showtime 
had not provided “actual and convincing” proof to discredit the negative 
impact adult businesses have on neighborhoods, nor did it convince the 
court that a nearly 9,000 square foot adult establishment would not detract 
from the town’s charm.135 
The First Circuit rejected the district court’s findings.136  Specifically, 
it held that the size and height restrictions were so underinclusive that the 
bylaws could not truly serve a substantial interest in maintaining the rural 
character of the town.137  It was uncontested that the Adult Entertainment 
                                                          
128.  Id. at 523. 
 
129.  Id.  
 
130.  Id.  
 
131.  See id. at 523–24. 
 
132.  Showtime I, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 523–24. 
 
133.  Id.  
 
134.  Id. 
 
135.  See id. 
 
136.  See Showtime II, 769 F.3d at 74. 
 
137.  Id. at 73–75. 
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Overlay District is a heavily commercialized zone “far from rural in 
nature,” and neighboring parcels that did not appear “rural” were not 
subject to the same size and height restrictions as Showtime’s equally not 
“rural” establishment.138  Further, the appellate court found that “a large 
adult-entertainment business has no secondary effect distinct from a large 
building of another sort, at least without reference to what goes on ‘in the 
building.’”139  Thus, because Showtime had agreed to comply with other 
regulations on building design and advertisements, Mendon failed to clarify 
how Showtime’s building would harm the community’s rural aesthetics any 
greater than a neighboring mainstream establishment would.140  The First 
Circuit also rejected the notion that adult establishments negatively affect 
neighboring property values.141  Mendon’s studies, the First Circuit 
concluded, presented only “limited” effects on home prices located near 
adult businesses and had no impact on homes more than several blocks 
away.142 
B. Preventing Traffic Congestion 
Mendon next argued that the ordinance’s size and hour restriction 
aimed to minimize significant traffic congestion caused by an influx of 
foreign customers.143  In support, it provided studies supporting a 
correlation between adult businesses and increased traffic congestion, and 
offered evidence that adult businesses often draw customers from foreign 
communities.144  The hour restriction, which prohibited Showtime from 
operating its business during school hours, was intended to ensure that the 
town’s school bus service would not suffer excessive traffic delays.145  The 
size restriction, on the other hand, would reduce to two-thirds the number 
                                                          
138.  Id. at 73–74. 
 
139.  Id. at 74.  
 
140.  Id. at 74–75. 
 
141.  Id. at 75 (accusing the town of attempting “to subtly change the contours of its stated 
interest”). 
 
142.  Showtime II, 769 F.3d at 75. 
 
143.  See Showtime I, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 521–22, 524. 
 
144.  Id. at 524. 
 
145.  See id. at 519, 524. 
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of patrons Showtime’s establishment could accommodate.146  While 
Showtime originally designed its business to fit 244 customers, its 
ordinance-friendly design could fit only 73.147 
Showtime countered with its own evidence to appease Mendon’s 
purported traffic concerns.148  For example, Showtime presented a study 
concluding that any traffic congestion caused by its establishment would be 
“negligible.”149  Thus, Showtime argued that Mendon’s purported interest 
in curbing the secondary effects of traffic was mere pretext.150 
The district court again applied Alameda Books and concluded that 
Mendon, which had no obligation to conduct independent studies, had met 
its initial burden because it was “entirely reasonable to expect” that a larger 
building that accommodated more staff and customers would have a larger 
impact on traffic than a smaller establishment.151  Additionally, Mendon 
could reasonably conclude that excess traffic caused by the business would 
delay the school bus system, and the town had an interest in restricting 
opening hours to 4:30 p.m. to prevent such a conflict.152  On the other hand, 
Showtime’s rebuttal study was flawed because it did not account for 
cumulative traffic effects caused by neighboring parcels.153  Thus, 
Showtime did not offer “actual and convincing” evidence to shift the 
burden back to Mendon.154 
Without applying the Alameda Books burden-shifting approach, the 
First Circuit concluded, “Mendon . . . [did] not set forth evidence that the 
bylaws actually further its substantial interest in curbing traffic congestion 
                                                          
146.  See id. at 524. 
 
147.  Id.  
 
148.  Id. at 523. 
 
149.  Showtime I, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 523. 
 
150.  See id. at 521 (contending that “the true purpose of the hours restriction is not to 
ameliorate traffic, but to prevent exposure of the regulated activity to children who ride the school 
bus”). 
 
151.  See id. at 522–24. 
 
152.  See id. at 524. 
 
153.  Id. at 523.  
 
154.  See id. at 523 (“Plaintiff’s objections do not convincingly discredit the town's 
asserted foundation for its zoning restrictions.”). 
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in a manner sufficient to survive intermediate scrutiny.”155  First, the court 
noted that Mendon failed to demonstrate how adult businesses cause any 
more traffic than large, commercial businesses along the same route.156  
Next, the First Circuit “conducted an independent review” of Mendon’s 
proffered studies and found them to be “largely anecdotal” and 
unsupportive of any realistic traffic concerns.157  Finally, even if the adult 
business would attract traffic from out-of-town patrons, the court 
hypothesized that a roadside restaurant offering an “early-bird dinner 
special” would presumably cause the same effect, yet would not be subject 
to Mendon’s size or operating restrictions.158  According to the First 
Circuit, then, because Mendon did not impose regulations on other 
businesses that caused the same alleged secondary effects as Showtime’s 
business, “the bylaws [were] equally underinclusive as related to traffic 
concerns as they were to Mendon’s rural aesthetic.”159 
IV. ARGUMENT: THE FIRST CIRCUIT MISAPPLIED THE RENTON TEST AND 
IMPROPERLY FOUND MENDON’S ORDINANCE INVALID 
The First Circuit did not neatly apply the multi-step inquiry outlined 
in Renton.160  First, it did not decide whether the regulation was a time, 
manner, and place restriction or an outright ban.161  Since the ordinance 
merely restricted the size of Showtime’s building and its hours of 
operation, the ordinance indeed is properly considered a time, place, or 
manner restriction.162  Second, the First Circuit declined judgment on 
whether the ordinance was content-based or content-neutral.163  It explained 
                                                          
155.  Showtime II, 769 F.3d at 76. 
 
156.  Id.  
 
157.  Id. at 76–77. 
 
158.  Id. at 77–78. 
 
159.  See id. at 76. 
 
160.  See Showtime Entm’t, LLC v. Town of Mendon (Showtime II), 769 F.3d 61, 72–78 
(1st Cir. 2014). 
 
161.  See id. at 72–73 (explaining the content distinction but failing to characterize the 
ordinance as a content-neutral time, place, or manner restriction). 
 
162.  See Showtime Entm’t LLC v. Ammendolia (Showtime I), 885 F. Supp. 2d 507, 525 
(D. Mass. 2012) (characterizing the ordinance as a content-neutral time, place, and manner 
restriction). 
 
163.  See Showtime II, 769 F.3d at 72. 
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“the distinction is ultimately immaterial” because the ordinance could not 
withstand even intermediate scrutiny typically reserved for content-neutral 
bylaws.164 
The crux of the First Circuit’s objection to the ordinance stems from 
the remaining step of the inquiry, the two-part Renton test.165  Again, under 
the Renton test, a zoning regulation of adult businesses is constitutional 
where it: (1) is narrowly tailored to serve a substantial government purpose 
and (2) leaves open alternative channels of communication.166  In 
particular, the First Circuit found that Mendon’s bylaws were not narrowly 
tailored to serve a substantial government interest because Mendon failed 
to prove that the adult establishment would alter the town’s rural aesthetics 
or cause traffic congestion any more than other types of businesses not 
subject to the regulation.167  Therefore, the bylaws were “tellingly 
underinclusive” and could not survive intermediate scrutiny.168  The court 
did not address whether the regulation left open alternative avenues of 
communication. 
As explained below, the First Circuit erred when it found that 
Mendon’s zoning ordinance violated the First Amendment because it 
imposed a heightened Renton standard. 
A. Mendon’s Ordinance Is Narrowly Tailored to Serve Its Legitimate Goals 
of Maintaining Its Rural Aesthetics and Preventing Traffic Congestion 
The Supreme Court in Renton upheld a city ordinance that sought to 
“preserve the quality of urban life.”169  Surely, the Supreme Court could see 
similar value in preserving a town’s quality of rural life.  Here, the First 
Circuit explained that while Mendon’s interests in maintaining its aesthetic 
charm and preventing traffic congestion were “theoretically” substantial, 
                                                          
164.  Id.  
 
165.  The court did not specifically mention it was using the Renton test, but it outlined the 
Renton framework.  See id. at 71 (“This intermediate level of scrutiny allows regulations justified 
by neutral purposes, rather than by the content of speech, to survive so long as they support a 
significant government interest, do not burden substantially more speech than necessary, and 
leave available alternative channels of communication.”). 
 
166.  See Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986). 
 
167.  See Showtime II, 769 F.3d at 75, 78. 
 
168.  See id. 
 
169.  Id.  
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Mendon failed to prove that restricting the size and hours of Showtime’s 
establishment would serve these interests.170  However, Mendon’s bylaws 
(1) further the town’s legitimate interest in maintaining its rural aesthetics 
and preventing traffic congestion and (2) are narrowly tailored to serve 
these goals. 
1. Sufficient Evidentiary Support 
The First Circuit struck down the ordinance, in part, because it found 
that Mendon did not offer sufficient evidence that the regulations would 
adequately address its purported government interests.171  As explained 
below, Mendon reasonably relied on ample evidence to meet its burden 
under Renton and Alameda Books.172 
a. Aesthetics—Mendon’s Reasonable Conclusion that Adult Businesses 
Detract from Small Town Charm and Decreased Property Values, Even if 
Minimal, is Sufficient 
As outlined above, the First Circuit reasoned that Showtime’s non-
rural building would look identical to surrounding, non-rural buildings; the 
adult business’s lack of rural character cannot affect Mendon’s aesthetic 
charm any more than those equally-sized, non-rural structures; while 
studies show neighborhoods experience negative effects caused by adult 
entertainment businesses, the effects are limited in radius; these “patently 
underinclusive” shortcomings suggest the dispute is about “what goes on in 
the building” and is unrelated to the interest of maintaining the town’s 
charm.173 
The First Circuit’s reasoning fails for two reasons.  While the court 
correctly points out that the adult building’s exterior would mimic the non-
rural appearance and non-rural character of neighboring establishments, (1) 
Mendon could reasonably conclude that a gigantic adult business would 
further detract from the quality of its small-town charm, and (2) Mendon is 
entitled to impose restrictions that promote this interest, even though the 
restrictions do not eradicate the problem entirely.  As the district court 
correctly observed, “the fact that some large structures now exist on [Route 
                                                          
170.  See Showtime II, 769 F.3d at 78. 
 
171.  See id. 
 
172.  See id.  
 
173.  See id. at 74–75. 
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16] does not detract from the town’s concern that additional structures—
particularly ones dedicated to adult entertainment—would further detract 
from the rural character of the town as a whole.”174  Thus, while Mendon 
may be able to take more effective steps to solidify its small-town feel, it 
could reasonably conclude that downsizing a 9,000 square foot nude-
entertainment to 2,000 square feet could somewhat achieve its purpose.  
From the “numerous studies, reports, and articles” the town submitted, 
Mendon could reasonably believe that a gigantic adult business would 
detract from the quality of its small-town appeal.175  Residents of other 
towns, for example, have complained that adult businesses alter their small-
town feel and affect interactions with visiting business leaders.176  In this 
respect, Mendon could reasonably conclude that a 9,000 square foot adult 
business would detract from the quality of its small-town appeal more than 
a 2,000, appreciably smaller, square foot building.  And, consistent with 
Justice O’Connor’s reasoning in Pap’s A.M., Mendon is entitled to take 
minor steps to minimize harmful secondary effects, even where other 
remedies may prove more effective.177  Therefore, Mendon met its initial 
burden under Alameda Books because it relied on common judgment that 
its ordinance would target the unwanted secondary effect.178  Showtime, by 
contrast, has not provided “actual and convincing” evidence to rebut 
Mendon’s rationale.179 
                                                          
174.  Showtime I, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 523 (emphasis added). 
 
175.  Id. at 521 n.12; see Amy Reinink, Adult Businesses vs. Small Area Cities, 
GAINSEVILLE SUN, http://www.gainesville.com/article/20060227/LOCAL/202270353 202270353 
[http://perma.cc/G5EE-RW7T]; Officials: Strip Clubs Tarnish City’s Image, AUGUSTA 
CHRONICLE, http://chronicle.augusta.com/stories/2000/04/30/met_289671.shtml#.VtNtopMrKRu 
[http://perma.cc/B383-72ZQ]; see also Renton, 475 U.S. at 50 (explaining a city’s interest in 
preserving its quality of urban life “must be accorded high respect”). 
 
176.  See Reinink, supra note 177 (reporting several rural communities in which the 
residents complain about nude establishments ruining small-town values); Officials: Strip Clubs 
Tarnish City’s Image, supra note 177 (reporting that foreign business leaders who visit the city of 
Augusta, Georgia notice the presence of adult businesses across the street from the chamber of 
commerce building, which is not the type of image city officials want to portray). 
 
177.  See City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 282, 300–01 (2000) (explaining that even 
where a regulation may not greatly reduce the feared secondary effects, the regulation need only 
“further the interest in combating such effects”). 
 
178.  See City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425, 438–39 (2002) 
(explaining that a city can rely on common sense). 
 
179.  See Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 439 (describing the “actual and convincing” 
evidentiary standard). 
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Mendon’s second rural aesthetic justification, maintaining property 
values, fared no better before the appellate court.  The First Circuit rejected 
Mendon’s studies that purported to show that adult businesses cause a 
decline in surrounding property values and found no evidence that adult 
entertainment establishments have any true effect on the rural value of 
homes in surrounding areas.180  Importantly, however, the First Circuit’s 
reasoning fails because it imposes too high a burden on Mendon, as 
explained below. 
The Supreme Court has not specified the degree to which an adult 
business must detrimentally affect a town before the town can mitigate the 
business’s effect.181  Thus, even if the First Circuit is correct that 
surrounding homes are only minimally affected, no case law supports its 
conclusion that Mendon’s actions are unjustified.  Mendon could 
reasonably have a substantial government interest in mitigating even small 
impacts on its surrounding residential value.182 
Additionally, the Supreme Court has long recognized a correlation 
between declining property values and adult establishments.183  Thus, even 
if Mendon’s independent studies do not support this conclusion under 
Pap’s A.M., Mendon can permissibly rely on studies from other towns or 
from parties of former Supreme Court cases.184  Indeed, under Renton, 
Mendon was not required to provide its own studies, and the fact that it did 
further reinforces its justification.185  Based on its own studies and the 
Supreme Court’s prior holdings, Mendon could reasonably conclude that a 
smaller and subtler adult establishment would mitigate the effects of 
decreasing property values.186 As the Renton Court noted, municipalities 
                                                          
180.  Id.  
 
181.  See Renton, 475 U.S. at 51–52 (holding that a town must be allowed to determine 
detrimental secondary effects and experiment with solutions). 
 
182.  See id. at 51–52; see also Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 300–01 (reasoning that even 
where a regulation may not greatly reduce the feared secondary effects, the regulation need only 
“further the interest in combating such effects”). 
 
183.  Young v. Am. Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 55 (1976); Renton, 475 U.S. at 48 
(upholding ordinance aimed in part at maintaining surrounding property values). 
 
184.  Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 297 (holding that a party could rely on the city of Renton’s 
findings). 
 
185.  Renton, 475 U.S. at 51–52 (finding that a city is not required to provide its own 
studies but may rely on the experiences of other cities). 
 
186.  See id. (holding that a town must be allowed to determine detrimental secondary 
effects and experiment with solutions); see also Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S at 300–01 (explaining that 
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like Mendon must be given an opportunity to experiment with solutions to 
important problems.187 
In the 1999 case D.H.L. Associates v. O’Gorman, the First Circuit 
properly adhered to the Renton standard and found that a town did not need 
to provide its own studies, but could rely on the experiences of other cities 
in enacting its ordinance restricting nude dancing at a restaurant.188  The 
town needed only to provide some reasonable basis for believing that the 
ordinance would alleviate the targeted secondary effects.189  The Supreme 
Court’s Alameda Books decision allowed businesses the opportunity to cast 
doubt on evidence relied upon by municipalities.190  When a business does 
so, then, the Renton approach allowing towns to rely on outside studies 
may not go far enough.191 Nevertheless, where the town has provided 
sufficient evidence to support its position and the business has not disputed 
the town’s findings by “actual and convincing evidence,” the town has met 
its burden.192  Moreover, as mentioned earlier, a court cannot substitute its 
own judgment for the town where the town’s interpretation of its evidence 
is reasonable.193 
Here, Mendon did far more than was required under Renton and 
provided sufficient evidence to meet its burden under Alameda Books.194  
Mendon actually provided numerous studies supporting its position.195  The 
town cited a study where an appraiser identified “exterior building 
appearance” as a factor that affects property values.196  It cited another 
                                                          
even where a regulation may not greatly reduce the feared secondary effects, the regulation need 
only “further the interest in combating such effects”). 
 
187.  See Renton, 475 U.S. at 51–52 (holding that a town must be allowed to experiment 
with solutions to secondary effects). 
 
188.  D.H.L. Assocs. v. O’Gorman, 199 F.3d 50, 57 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 
189.  See id. 
 
190.  Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 438. 
 
191.  See generally Renton, 475 U.S. 41 (making no mention of burden-shifting or 
businesses providing contrasting studies). 
 
192.  Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 439. 
 
193.  Id. at 437–38. 
 
194.  See Showtime I, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 524. 
 
195.  See id.  
 
196.  Id. 
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study that found that “the more visible a sexually-oriented business is, the 
more impact it has.”197 
Furthermore, the First Circuit’s approach in requiring Mendon to 
prove that its size and operating restriction is the only plausible solution to 
maintaining its small town charm was nearly identical to the approach the 
Supreme Court rejected in Alameda Books.198  The First Circuit improperly 
came to its own conclusion based on the evidence before it, even where the 
town’s interpretation of the data was reasonable.199  Accordingly, the 
Supreme Court had stated a town must be granted reasonable latitude to 
enact its own ordinances.200  Here, because Mendon “reasonably believed 
[Showtime’s establishment was] relevant” to the town’s declining property 
values, it should have been allowed to experiment with reasonable 
solutions.201 
As the district court in the instant case noted, the Supreme Court 
“does not require a court to re-weigh the evidence considered by a 
legislative body, nor does it empower a court to substitute its judgment in 
regards to whether a regulation will best serve the community.”202  Rather, 
“the court must give due credit to legislative statements of policy where . . . 
they inform an inquiry into legislative purpose by identifying specific 
secondary effects that the town may target without offending the 
constitution.”203  For the reasons explained above, the First Circuit erred in 
imposing too high a burden on Mendon. 
b. A Court May Not Substitute its Judgment for Mendon’s Reasonable 
Conclusion that Adult Businesses Significantly Increase Traffic Congestion 
Although Mendon provided numerous studies explaining the effects 
Showtime’s adult establishment would have on traffic, the First Circuit 
conducted an “independent review” of the studies and determined that they 
                                                          
197.  Id.  
 
198.  See id. at 75; see also Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 437–38. 
 
199.  See Showtime II, 769 F.3d at 75; see also Showtime I, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 524. 
 
200.  See Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41,at 51–52 (1986) (holding that a town 
must be allowed to experiment with solutions to secondary effects). 
 
201.  Id. 
 
202.  Id.  
 
203.  Id. at 521.  
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were inadequate.204  According to the Court, the studies were “largely 
anecdotal, rel[ied] nearly exclusively on personal perceptions rather than 
verifiable data, and include[d] significant hedging language, such as 
indicating that increased traffic is merely a hypothesis.”205  The court also 
referenced a competing study offered by Showtime concluding that its 
establishment would cause only negligible traffic effects.206 
In a similar approach toward Mendon’s asserted interest in 
maintaining rural aesthetics argument, the First Circuit erred by requiring 
Mendon to prove that its ordinance would mitigate traffic.207  The court 
improperly required that Mendon offer verifiable data, even though 
Mendon could not empirically collect figures until after Showtime had 
already built its establishment.208  Moreover, under Alameda Books, a 
town’s initial burden requires no more than common sense to adjudge the 
business’s likely secondary effects.209  It is reasonable to conclude, as the 
District Court observed, that a 9,000 square foot building accommodating 
244 customers and operating during school bus operating hours could cause 
significant traffic delays.210 
Furthermore, because restricting Showtime to downsize its building 
and not operate during school hours was a plausible remedy to the area’s 
traffic problem, the court should not have substituted its judgment for 
Mendon’s.211  Mendon should have been granted latitude to experiment 
with reasonable solutions to its problem.212 
                                                          
204.  See id. at 76–77 (listing each study Mendon relied on). 
 
205.  Id. at 77.  
 
206.  Id. at 76. 
 
207.  See id. at 76–77. 
 
208.  There is no evidence of other strip clubs in the area and thus no way Mendon could 
empirically test these hypotheses.  See Renton, 475 U.S. at 50 (“The Court of Appeals ruled, 
however, that because the Renton ordinance was enacted without the benefit of studies 
specifically relating to ‘the particular problems or needs of Renton,’ the city’s justifications for 
the ordinance were ‘conclusory and speculative.’  We think the Court of Appeals imposed on the 
city an unnecessarily rigid burden of proof.  The record in this case reveals that Renton relied 
heavily on the experience of, and studies produced by, the city of Seattle.”). 
 
209.  See Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 438–39. 
 
210.  See Showtime I, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 524. 
 
211.  See Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 437–38. 
 
212.  See Renton, 475 U.S. at 51–52 (holding that a town must be allowed to experiment 
with solutions to secondary effects). 
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Granted, the First Circuit noted that Showtime offered its own study 
rebutting Mendon’s findings.213  Under Alameda Books, the burden of 
proof may shift back to the town that enacts the ordinance when a business 
successfully casts doubt on the town’s evidence by providing its own 
study.214  However, the traffic study Showtime offered did not offer 
verifiable data (its conclusions were hypothetical, given that the 
establishment had not been built yet) and did not account for the 
cumulative effect of traffic from neighboring parcels (as the district court 
notably pointed out).215  Thus, Mendon, which was not required even to 
provide its own studies, more than met its burden and Showtime failed to 
cast doubt on these studies with “actual and convincing” evidence. 
A rural case study conducted on an adult entertainment establishment 
in Montrose, Illinois, supports Mendon’s insight.216  Soon after the “Lion’s 
Den” opened in Montrose, an adult business marketing “X-rated videos, 
books, and novelties” for purchase “24/7”, residents complained of 
significant traffic increases.217  In fact, the gravel access road that led 
toward the establishment broke down because it could not handle the 
weight of big trucks that started making their way into the area.218  Before 
the adult business had opened, foreign travelers had no reason to exit the I-
70 into Montrose.219  In short, Mendon’s traffic concerns were justified and 
sufficiently supported. 
2. Sufficient Narrow Tailoring 
The First Circuit explained that “[m]ere reference to a neutral intent 
does not suffice to satisfy Mendon’s burden to prove that its bylaws in fact 
further a substantial government interest “220  It then found that despite 
Mendon’s purported government interests, the ordinance did not ban more 
                                                          
213.  See Showtime II, 769 F.3d at 68. 
 
214.  Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 439. 
 
215.  See Showtime I, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 516, 523. 
 
216.  See Alan C. Weinstein & Richard D. McCleary, The Association of Adult Businesses 
with Secondary Effects: Legal Doctrine, Social Theory, and Empirical Evidence, 29 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 565, 593 (2012). 
 
217.  See id.  
 
218.  See id.  
 
219.  See id. 
 
220.  Showtime II, 769 F.3d at 72. 
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wholesome businesses that caused the same detrimental secondary effects 
as Showtime’s adult establishment.221  Thus, according to the court, 
because the ordinance left unscathed all other businesses that also produced 
these secondary effects, the ordinance was underinclusive.222 
a. Regulating Only Businesses That Affect the Town’s Charm 
The First Circuit found Mendon’s ordinance underinclusive, first, 
because it curtailed Showtime’s speech without affecting similarly non-
rural neighboring buildings.223  However, while the bylaws may appear to 
single out Showtime’s business, Mendon did not act unconstitutionally.224  
As noted earlier, a regulation must “affect only that category of 
[establishments] shown to produce the unwanted secondary effects.”225  In 
accordance with this rule, Mendon’s ordinance is no broader than necessary 
to achieve its rural aesthetic and traffic goals.  Thus, the First Circuit 
should have found the ordinance valid. 
The First Circuit did not provide sufficient justification that Mendon’s 
bylaws are unconstitutionally under-inclusive, because underinclusiveness 
“does not invalidate an otherwise-permissible zoning ordinance . . . [that] is 
well-supported by a substantial government interest.”226  The court did not 
consider that the promiscuous nature of Showtime’s business alone can 
detract from town aesthetics, irrespective of its outer appearance.227  For 
example, town-goers and visitors may stumble upon sexually explicit litter 
in nearby areas.228  The district court also cited studies demonstrating a 
                                                          
221.  Id. at 74. 
 
222.  Id.  
 
223.  See id.  
 
224.  See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 387 (1992) (“[T]he First Amendment 
imposes not an ‘underinclusiveness’ limitation but a ‘content discrimination’ limitation” upon a 
State’s prohibition of proscribable speech.”). 
 
225.  Renton, 475 U.S. at 52. 
 
226.  See Showtime II, 769 F.3d at 73–74; Showtime I, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 526. 
 
227.  See Showtime I, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 524 (citing Mendon’s studies on positive 
correlation between blight and adult business); Young, 427 U.S. 50 (accepting that adult 
businesses cause secondary effects); Weinstein & McCleary, supra note 218, at 594 (presenting 
evidence that the Lion’s Den “sexually explicit litter” decreased use of the nearby in park). 
 
228.  See Weinstein & McCleary, supra note 218, at 594. 
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positive correlation between adult entertainment and blight.229  
Furthermore, although the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that 
adult businesses, specifically, can detrimentally impact the overall quality 
of neighborhoods,230 the First Circuit readily and unjustifiably did 
enunciated justification to depart from this approach.  Instead, it reasoned 
that a court should “rightly pay attention to underinclusiveness where it 
reveals significant doubts that the government indeed has a substantial 
interest that is furthered by its proffered purpose.”231  Its justification 
appears to question whether Mendon’s government interests are mere 
pretexts, since the restrictions do not affect all large commercial 
structures.232  However, the appellate court failed to did explain how 
neighboring movie theaters or hardware stores have the same detrimental 
effect on a town’s aesthetic charm or property values as a 9,000 square foot 
adult establishment.  Indeed, as the Supreme Court explained in Renton, 
Mendon can later rewrite its bylaws to include any businesses that it may 
later discover cause the same detrimental secondary effects.233  Because 
there is no reason to believe that other types of large businesses detract 
from Mendon’s charm or residential property values, its bylaws are 
narrowly tailored against adult businesses to further its stated goals. 
b. Regulating Only Businesses Likely to Have Detrimental Effects on 
Traffic 
The First Circuit also found Mendon’s ordinance underinclusive 
because it did not differentiate between traffic effects caused by 
Showtime’s adult business and other types of businesses along Route 16.234  
Further, the court determined that Mendon did not adequately explain why 
commercial businesses/attractions (a diner’s “early-bird dinner special”) 
                                                          
229.  See Showtime I, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 524 (citing Mendon’s studies on positive 
correlation between blight and adult business). 
 
230.  See, e.g., Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425 (accepting city’s judgment that adult 
businesses cause detrimental effects); Renton, 475 U.S. 41 (recognizing correlation between adult 
businesses and secondary effects); Young, 427 U.S. 50 (accepting that adult businesses cause 
secondary effects). 
 
231.  Showtime II, 769 F.3d at 73. 
 
232.  See id. 
 
233.  See Renton, 475 U.S. at 52–53 (explaining that a city can later re-write bylaws if 
new businesses cause detrimental secondary effects). 
 
234.  See Showtime II, 769 F.3d at 76–78. 
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along Route 16.235  Yet the adult business in Renton made a similar 
“underinclusive” argument,236 and there the Supreme Court expressly 
concluded, “[t]hat Renton chose first to address the potential problems 
created by one particular kind of . . . business in no way suggests that the 
city has ‘singled out’ [Playtime Theatres] for discriminatory treatment.”237 
Studies show that adult establishments serve as a special draw for out-
of-towners that may not have similar businesses in their hometowns.238  It 
is unclear that a general movie theater, for example, attracts a similar 
number of visitors.  Moreover, although the First Circuit noted that out-of-
towners may similarly flock to an early-bird dinner special, Mendon has 
demonstrated no reason to fear the secondary effects caused by these 
restaurants.239  As the Supreme Court explained in Renton, Mendon can 
later rewrite its bylaws to impose size or time restrictions on a gigantic 
restaurant offering an early bird dinner special if it fears the restaurant will 
cause problematic traffic congestion.240  However, until other businesses 
pose similar problems, Mendon “must be allowed a reasonable opportunity 
to experiment with solutions to admittedly serious problems.”241  
Accordingly, Mendon’s bylaws are properly narrowly tailored to target 
unwanted secondary effects. 
B. Reasonable Alternative Avenues of Communication 
Under the second element of the Renton test, an ordinance may 
survive intermediate scrutiny only where it provides the affected business 
                                                          
235.  Id. 
 
236.  See Renton, 475 U.S. at 52 (“[Playtime Theatres] contend that the Renton ordinance 
is “underinclusive,” in that it fails to regulate other kinds of adult businesses that are likely to 
produce secondary effects similar to those produced by adult theaters.  On this record the 
contention must fail.”). 
 
237.  Id. at 52–53. 
 
238.  See, e.g., Showtime I, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 524 (referencing Mendon’s study showing 
that adult businesses draw out-of-town patrons); see also Weinstein & McCleary, supra note 218, 
at 593 (describing how residents were not used to traffic before the adult store opened, as 
travelers had few other reasons to exit the I-70). 
 
239.  See Showtime II, 769 F.3d at 78. 
 
240.  See id.; see also Renton, 475 U.S. at 52–53 (explaining that a city can later re-write 
bylaws if new businesses cause detrimental secondary effects). 
 
241.  Renton, 475 U.S. at 52 (citing Am. Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 71). 
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with “reasonable alternative avenues of communication.”242  Here, the First 
Circuit did not apparently reach this element of the Renton test, perhaps 
because it found that Mendon’s bylaws did not meet a substantial 
government interest.243  In any event, Mendon’s ordinance clearly meets 
this element.  In both Renton and D.H.L. Associates, the courts respectively 
affirmed decisions where the ordinances would have forced businesses to 
relocate.244  In each of those cases, the issue of “alternative reasonable 
communications” hinged on whether the areas that the businesses could 
relocate to were reasonable.245  In Renton, the ordinance provided the adult 
movie theater reasonable alternative avenues of communication where the 
theater could have opened on any of 520 acres of land.246  According to the 
Court, the 520 acres of land consisted of “ample, accessible real estate.”247 
Similarly, the First Circuit in D.H.L. Associates found that the 
restaurant had reasonable alternative avenues of communication where it 
could have relocated to the area specifically zoned to allow adult 
entertainment, even where there were only ten acres on which the 
restaurant could operate.248  There, the First Circuit noted that courts must 
look to multiple factors to determine whether a business can reasonably 
relocate, including “the percentage of land theoretically available to adult 
businesses, the number of sites potentially available in relation to the 
population of the city, the number of sites compared with the existing 
number of adult businesses, [and] the number of businesses desiring to 
offer adult entertainment.”249  Here, by contrast, Mendon’s bylaws do not 
even mandate that Showtime relocate its establishment.250  The ordinance 
                                                          
242.  Id. at 50. 
 
243.  See Showtime II, 769 F.3d at 78 (referencing “alternative channels of 
communication” but not applying the facts to the test). 
 
244.  See generally Renton, 475 U.S. 41; D.H.L. Assocs., 199 F.3d 50. 
 
245.  See Renton, 475 U.S. at 53; D.H.L. Assocs., 199 F.3d at 59–60. 
 
246.  Renton, 475 U.S. at 53. 
 
247.  Id.  
 
248.  D.H.L. Assocs., 199 F.3d at 59–60. 
 
249.  Id.  
 
250.  See Showtime I, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 516; see also Renton, 475 U.S. at 48 (“As 
JUSTICE POWELL observed in American Mini Theatres, ‘[if] [the city] had been concerned 
with restricting the message purveyed by adult theaters, it would have tried to close them or 
restrict their number rather than circumscribe their choice as to location.’”). 
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allows Showtime to operate its establishment exactly where it is, but 
requires that it merely decrease the size of the building and open after 4:30 
p.m.251  Thus, the only aspect of Showtime’s speech that the ordinance 
curtails, then, is based on the size and hours restriction.252  However, 
because the business can still accommodate at least 73 patrons, can open 
starting at 4:30 p.m., and can remain open throughout the night, Showtime 
has more alternative means of communication than the businesses in 
Renton and D.H.L. Associates.253  Accordingly, Mendon’s bylaws meet the 
second element of the Renton test. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Robert Mangiaratti, Mendon’s legal counsel, stated, “[t]here’s no 
evidence that the town of Mendon cares whether people dance nude or 
whether they don’t.”254  Mangiaratti continued, I don’t think this is a 
pretext [to ban adult entertainment], I think this is a small town concerned 
about the impacts to the community.”255  If Mendon’s primary purpose was 
to eliminate Showtime from opening altogether, it could have made its 
bylaws far more restrictive or, like the ordinances in Renton and D.H.L. 
Associates,256 forced Showtime to relocate. 
Mendon has a legal right to prohibit businesses from causing harmful 
effects to the town.257  Its reasons for somewhat limiting Showtime’s ability 
to operate—maintaining its small-town charm and preventing traffic 
congestion—are concerns common to many municipalities.258  Because 
                                                          
251.  Showtime I, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 516. 
 
252.  See id.  
 
253.  See id.  See generally Renton, 475 U.S. 41; D.H.L. Assocs., 199 F.3d 50. 
 
254.  Mike Gleason, Mendon, Strip Club Face Off on Alcohol Ban, MILFORD DAILY 
NEWS (Mar. 6, 2015, 12:26 PM), 
http://www.milforddailynews.com/article/20150306/NEWS/150307615 [https://perma.cc/6D72-
TMFP]. 
 
255.  Id. 
 
256.  See generally Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41 (1986); D.H.L. Assocs. v. 
O’Gorman, 199 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 
257.  See City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425, 433 (2002) (holding that 
a municipality can seek to eliminate harmful secondary effects). 
 
258.  Showtime Entm’t, LLC v. Town of Mendon, 769 F.3d 61, 73 (1st Cir. 2014); see 
e.g., Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425 (accepting city’s judgment that adult businesses cause 
detrimental effects); Renton, 475 U.S. 41 (recognizing correlation between adult businesses and 
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these secondary effects Mendon sought to regulate are substantial 
government interests and because Mendon’s bylaws pass the Renton test, 
the ordinance passes constitutional muster and the First Circuit’s ruling 
should be overturned. 
 
                                                          
secondary effects); Young v. Am. Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (accepting that adult 
businesses cause secondary effects). 
